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Reforming	the	WTO,	part	5:	how	should	the	burden	be
shared?
In	the	last	of	our	series	on	the	challenges	facing	the	World	Trade	Organisation,	Ceylan	Inan	and	Ira	Poensgren
(LSE)	look	at	the	tensions	that	have	emerged	between	developed	and	developing	countries	as	they	try	to	agree
how	to	treat	each	other.	The	definitions	of	‘developed’	and	‘developing’	are	contested,	not	least	by	the	US,	which
particularly	resents	the	benefits	China	and	India	enjoy	through	their	continued	status	as	developing	nations.
Over	the	last	30	years,	the	distribution	of	power	in	the	multilateral	trading	system	has	become	increasingly
diversified.	In	GATT	years,	it	was	not	unusual	for	a	small	group	of	OECD	countries	(mainly	the	“Quad”	consisting	of
Japan,	the	EU,	the	United	States	&	Canada)	to	dictate	the	significant	elements	of	any	negotiating	agenda.	With
rising	economies	like	China,	India	and	Brazil	accounting	for	ever-larger	shares	of	world	trade,	such	a	situation	is
unthinkable	in	today’s	WTO.
Shanghai…	developed	or	developing?	Photo:	Rick	Massey	via	a	CC	BY	2.0	licence
This	new	dynamic	has	given	rise	to	various	new	conflicts	and	debates.	Perhaps	the	most	contentious	are	questions
regarding	differentiation:	how	to	accommodate	the	needs	of	developing	countries,	while	ensuring	that	the	costs	of
multilateralism	are	shared	equitably.
The	international	trading	regime	acknowledges	the	need	to	support	developing	countries	as	they	liberalise	their
economies	and	expose	their	sectors	to	global	competition.	In	the	WTO,	all	self-declared	developing	countries
benefit	from	155	“special	and	differential	treatment”	(S&DT)	provisions	embedded	across	various	agreements,
including	higher	levels	of	bound	tariff	rates,	longer	implementation	periods	and	less	stringent	reporting	and
notification	requirements,	among	others.	Technically,	the	key	to	unlocking	these	features	is	available	to	everyone:
WTO	treaties	don’t	include	any	concrete	criteria	to	identify	a	developing	country,	except	for	LDCs	and	net	food-
importing	countries.	While	few	members	disregard	the	need	to	accommodate	different	levels	of	development	and
distinct	challenges	of	LDCs	in	trade	rules,	the	questions	of	how	to	define,	designate	and	graduate	a	developing
country	remain	unanswered.
How	viable	is	differentiation	right	now?
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Trading	partners	disagree	on	the	ends	S&DT	provisions	are	meant	to	serve	in	developing	economies,	and	critics
argue	there	is	little	evidence	they	promote	growth	and	development.	Proponents	of	S&DT	argue	this	is	due	to	a
series	of	shortcomings	in	the	way	in	which	differentiation	is	designed.	Sectors	in	which	developing	countries
possess	a	comparative	advantage,	like	agriculture	and	textiles,	remain	among	the	most	protected.	Many	of	the
S&DT	provisions	remain	non-binding	and	based	on	generalised	processes	lacking	defined	targets	where	non-
compliance	cannot	really	be	shown	–	for	example,	the	obligation	to	review	the	“development	impact”	of	a	particular
measure.	Even	when	a	detrimental	effect	can	be	shown,	key	agreements	don’t	specify	the	withdrawal,	modification
or	remedy	of	the	measure	concerned.
More	fundamentally,	the	prescription	often	does	not	match	the	patient.	Flexibilities	allowing	subsidies	and
safeguards	are	not	enough	to	promote	or	protect	disadvantaged	groups	in	developing	countries.	Some	provisions,
most	notably	the	safeguard	clause	in	the	Agreement	on	Agriculture,	have	even	ironically	led	to	a	situation	of
“reverse	differentiation”	where	the	existing	flexibilities	can	in	essence	only	be	used	by	developed	members	of	the
WTO.
The	debate:	who	wants	what?
Developing	countries	in	the	WTO	have	therefore	long	argued	that	the	existing	S&DT	provisions	are	(at	best)
insufficient.	They	fought	fiercely	and	succeeded	in	including	the	strengthening	of	S&DT	in	the	mandate	of	the	Doha
Development	Round	to	make	them	more	“precise,	effective	and	operational”,	but	negotiations	remain	gridlocked.
Nearly	two	decades	later,	developing	members	continue	to	demand	greater	policy	space,	better-targeted
instruments	and	increased	support	to	pursue	unique	development	strategies,	shield	disadvantaged	groups	and
calibrate	their	integration	into	the	global	economy.	For	them,	proposals	by	developed	members	disavow	them	of	the
political	commitment	to	the	Doha	mandate,	and	to	development	more	generally.
Most	developing	members,	including	China	and	India,	insist	on	centring	the	reform	debate	around	the	scope	and
depth	of	the	S&DT	provisions,	and	contend	that	self-designation	is	the	most	appropriate	means	of	determining	a
country’s	development	needs.	Recently	some	emerging	markets	voluntarily	renounced	their	developing	country
privileges,	either	as	a	result	of	their	enhanced	economic	status	like	South	Korea	or	for	political	gains	on	other
issues.	Brazil,	for	instance,	pledged	to	give	up	its	developing	country	status	in	exchange	for	US	support	for	the
country’s	OECD	membership.	Finally,	smaller	economies	pursue	varying	strategies,	including	openness	to
schemes	which	position	them	closer	to	LDCs	than	China	and	India,	given	that	the	former	can	be	expected	to
continue	to	benefit	from	S&DT.
On	the	other	side	of	the	debate,	developed	members	refuse	to	deepen	the	preferential	treatment	without	being	able
to	control	which	parties	qualify	and	for	how	long.	They	express	concerns	about	giving	members	at	different	levels	of
development	the	same	concessions	–	not	without	the	support	of	some	developing	countries	as	well.	According	to
developed	countries,	the	inefficient	resource	allocation	that	results	from	the	existing	system	of	differentiation	is	what
distorts	the	ability	of	SD&T	to	provide	adequate	support	to	those	countries	that	need	it	the	most.	They	have	called
on	relatively	advanced	developing	members	to	renounce	their	status	and	to	take	on	their	“fair	share”	of	the	cost	of
multilateralism.	For	developed	countries,	self-designation	is	too	chaotic,	and	an	institutionalised	graduation
mechanism	is	indispensable	if	S&DT	is	to	enable	all	beneficiaries	to	become	part	of	the	multilateral	trading	system.
The	issue	then	becomes	the	highly	quarrelsome	task	of	defining	eligibility	criteria	under	the	consensus	norm.	In
2019,	Washington	proposed	hard	criteria	(e.g.	high	income,	the	share	of	global	trade,	membership	in	the	OECD	or
G20)	to	define	what	should	not	characterise	a	developing	country.	Striving	to	calm	US	concerns	and	preserve	the
rules-based	multilateral	trading	system,	the	EU	delivered	concrete	proposals	and	Canada	convened	the	so-called
Ottawa	Group	of	diverse	WTO	members	to	scrutinise	reform.	While	the	members	of	this	group	share	US	concerns
that	the	WTO	must	adapt	to	contemporary	power	dynamics,	they	propose	a	flexible,	issue-based	approach,	rather
than	the	generalised	hard	criteria	proposed	by	the	US.
Challenges
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Finding	a	compromise	in	this	network	of	conflicting	interests	faces	three	underlying	challenges.	The	first	is	the
fundamental	disagreement	over	the	nature	of	today’s	development	divide.	For	the	US	and	the	EU	and	other	OECD
economies,	the	binary	North-South	logic	that	underpinned	negotiations	in	the	GATT	no	longer	reflects	the
contemporary	reality	where	emerging	markets	are	rapidly	gaining	market	power.	In	contrast,	developing	countries
argue	that	while	their	economic	conditions	may	be	more	diversified	today,	the	development	gap	nonetheless
persists	and	continues	to	grow,	citing	their	poor	performance	in	per	capita	and	human	development	indicators.	It	is
therefore	unclear	what	the	WTO	mandate	should	be	on	helping	countries	address	their	“development	challenges”.
The	second	challenge	is	the	question	of	how	to	accommodate	China,	which	threatens	the	market	power	of
industrialised	countries	and	has	a	state-capitalist	model	that	does	not	fit	the	vocabulary	of	liberal	market	economies.
China’s	ability	to	retain	developing	country	status	despite	its	unprecedented	economic	growth	has	upset	the	trade-
off	between	developing	and	developed	members.	Beijing	relinquished	many	S&DT	provisions	and	made	significant
commitments	exceeding	those	of	developing	countries	(and	sometimes	those	of	developed	countries)	when	it
acceded	to	the	WTO	in	2001.	Yet	China	also	has	a	notoriously	poor	track	record	of	compliance	with	its
transparency	and	notification	requirements,	so	doubts	remain	that	these	commitments	are	being	fulfilled.	The
problem	is	that	as	long	as	China	benefits	from	the	same	form	of	S&DT	as	other	developing	countries,	it	significantly
raises	the	costs	for	developed	members	of	conceding	to	demands	for	strengthening	differentiation.
The	third	challenge	is	the	lack	of	political	will	to	find	common	ground	by	the	United	States.	It	is	no	secret	that
President	Trump	is	highly	critical	of	the	WTO	and	willing	to	go	to	unprecedented	lengths	to	block	the	system	until
the	cards	are	reshuffled	in	his	favour.	The	differentiation	impasse	is	compounded	by	his	administration’s	broader
agenda	of	rectifying	“imbalances”	embedded	in	multilateral	institutions	and	bilateral	trade	relations.	With	the
termination	of	US	preferences	for	India	and	Turkey’s	participation	in	its	GSP	programme	and	a	continuing	trade	war
with	China,	2019	saw	the	US	launch	battles	to	pressure	multiple	targets	to	give	up	their	developing	country	status.
In	a	July	2019	memorandum,	the	White	House	declared	that	it	would	not	tolerate	the	categorisation	of	countries	as
beneficiaries	of	the	privileges	if	they	do	not	fit	its	own	proposed	criteria.
Finding	a	way	forward
Any	potential	solution	to	the	first	challenge	has	to	strike	a	delicate	balance	between	flexibility	and	strictness.	The
proposed	solutions	can	be	roughly	sorted	into	country-based	and	issue-based	approaches.
The	problem	with	the	former	approach,	as	taken	in	the	US	proposal,	is	that	negotiations	will	invariably	centre	on	the
criteria	used	to	determine	an	overall	development	status.	This	risks	repeating	the	inefficiency	inherent	to	any	form
of	generalisation	(including	self-designation)	by	overly	simplifying	the	challenges	involved	in	alleviating	poverty.	It
fosters	a	gridlock	where	both	sides	cherry-pick	criteria	that	either	include	and	exclude	particular	states.
The	latter	approach,	taken	by	the	Ottawa	Group,	rests	on	the	negotiation	of	differentiation	principles	for	individual
issue-areas.	This	shifts	the	focus	away	from	blanket	privileges	and	towards	targeted	remedies	for	specific
developmental	deficits,	offering	much	more	room	for	compromise.	Developed	economies	could	agree	to	such	an
approach	if	it	provides	a	graduation	mechanism	that	limits	free-riding.	Developing	countries	are	likely	to	insist	that,
rather	than	having	to	prove	their	eligibility	to	access	S&DT	provisions,	they	are	granted	access	until	agreed	upon
graduation	triggers	are	reached.	What	makes	this	solution	unpalatable	to	some	is	the	sheer	complexity	of	such	a
negotiation,	as	both	forms	of	differentiation	and	trigger	levels	have	to	be	agreed	upon	on	a	case-by-case	basis.
However,	substantive	compromise	seems	possible.
Regarding	the	second	challenge,	it	is	true	that	the	rapid	rise	of	strong	trade	partners	has	created	new	hardships.	In
short,	it	seems	unlikely	that	the	US	or	the	EU	would	agree	to	any	solution	that	doesn’t	impose	new	disciplines	on
emerging	WTO	members.	In	terms	of	different	models	of	development,	in	the	past	the	trading	system	has	found
creative	ways	to	absorb	cooperative	countries	with	different	often	less	liberal	economic	growth	models.	It	remains
remarkable	that	the	awkward	stranger	of	a	different	era,	Japan,	now	appears	as	a	signatory	to	trilateral	declarations
with	the	US	and	the	EU,	striving	to	contain	growing	competition	from	emerging	markets.
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It	is	unclear,	however,	how	the	third	challenge	can	be	overcome.	Thus	far,	the	Trump	administration	has	rejected
other	countries’	reform	proposals,	both	developing	and	developed.	Washington	further	categorically	refuses	to
engage	in	any	discussion	that	couples	China	and	India	with	continued	development	challenges.	On	a	mission	to
“make	trade	more	free,	fair	and	reciprocal”,	it	remains	unclear	what	compromise	would	suffice	to	assuage	the	White
House’s	concerns	and	catalyse	the	reform	negotiations.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	LSE.	It	is	the	fifth	in	a	series
looking	at	the	challenges	facing	the	WTO;	the	first	post	is	here.	It	draws	on	an	extensive	simulation	of	WTO	reform
as	part	of	an	LSE	International	Relations	Department	masters	course	option	in	economic	diplomacy.
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